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ABSTRACT
The standard view of the political economy of public debt is that myopic and unconstrained politicians
prefer to disregard intertemporal smoothing considerations and extract political rents as fast as possible.
From this perspective, it seems that the world has much to celebrate, as most emerging market economies
-- often suspect of having weak political institutions -- have chosen to save rather than waste most
of their exceptional income from high commodity prices. Unfortunately, the optimistic conclusion
that these countries may have turned the corner with respect to public resource management may be
premature. In this paper we show that while it is true that in the long run there is a negative connection
between the level of public debt and the quality of political institutions, this needs not be the case in
the short run. Quite the opposite, in the short run, governments with weak political institutions are
likely to save more than governments with better institutions facing the same uncertainty. This is due
to an option value of rent-seeking whereby the prospect of potentially squandering funds in the future
makes governments more "precautionary" today. We show that this result relies on three assumptions:
Economic risk is high relative to political risk, markets are sufficiently incomplete, and there exists
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The standard view of the political economy of public debt is that myopic and uncon-
strained politicians prefer to disregard intertemporal smoothing considerations and ex-
tract political rents as fast as possible.1 The experience of Venezuela￿ s government, with
its chronic squandering of ￿scal resources during times of oil bonanza, is a stark case in
point. From this perspective, it seems that the world has much to celebrate, as most
emerging market economies￿ often suspect of having weak political institutions￿ have cho-
sen to save rather than waste most of their exceptional income from high commodity
prices. For example, Russia￿ s government debt declined from 59 percent of GDP in 2000
to 7 percent of GDP in 2007. Over the same period, Chile￿ s government debt declined
from 14 percent of GDP to less than 4 percent of GDP in 2007.2 Is it the case that after
years of disregarding external advice, political institutions in these countries have turned
the corner with respect to public resource management?
Unfortunately, a positive answer to this question may be premature. In this paper we
explain why, by presenting a model where rent-seeking politicians balance their incentives
to protect the economy from shocks and their desire for rents. In this context, we show
that while it is true that in the long run there is a negative connection between the level
of public debt and the quality of political institutions, this need not be the case in the
short run. Quite the opposite, governments with weak political institutions are likely to
save more than governments with better institutions facing the same uncertainty. This
is due to an option value of rent-seeking whereby the prospect of potentially squandering
funds in the future makes governments more ￿precautionary￿today.
In particular, weak political institutions promote over-saving starting from an inter-
mediate level of debt but promote over-borrowing once the government has reached a low
enough level of debt. These two e⁄ects are related. Politicians facing low constraints on
rent-seeking have an incentive to keep taxes high and save, that is ￿in￿ ate the beast,￿
since they look forward to squandering these savings in a future boom while simultane-
ously protecting the economy in the event of a future downturn. In contrast, if politicians
are very constrained in their ability to squander these savings in future booms, they save
less in the short run, but they also squander less in the long run. Eventually, more con-
strained politicians reach lower levels of debt than less constrained politicians, who would
have otherwise squandered accumulations. This characterization is displayed in Figure
1Alesina and Perotti (1994) provide a survey of this literature. Also see Battaglini and Coate (2008).
2These statistics refer to gross public debt. If one nets governments￿assets (sovereign wealth funds,
in particular), then the improvements are even more dramatic. The 2000 data are from Jaimovich and
Panizza (2006) and the 2007 data are from Central Intelligence Agency (2008).
11, which compares the simulated path of debt implied by our model under a strongly
institutionalized government relative to the path of debt under a weakly institutionalized
government (see Section 4 for details).
Figure 1: Path of Debt














Strong Institutions Weak Institutions
The mechanism behind the option value of rent-seeking is as follows: Whenever politi-
cal institutions become weaker, politicians begin to overweight the value of rent-seeking in
their policy objective. Moreover, the increase in the value of funds is strongest in a future
boom since rent-seeking is concentrated in this period. Consequently, a reduction in the
quality of political institutions creates a motivation for politicians to over-save because of
the improved prospect of extracting rents at a future date. This additional motivation to
save is even more pronounced if it is combined with high economic uncertainty, since high
economic uncertainty raises the prospect of being able to extract even greater resources
as rents in a future boom.
Our over-saving result builds on three central assumptions: First, economic uncer-
tainty is high relative to political risk. This ensures that politicians are su¢ ciently moti-
vated by the prospect of future rent-seeking. In the absence of this assumption, a rent-
seeking government is likely to over-borrow since there is only a small chance of it being
able to extract more rents in the future. Second, markets are su¢ ciently incomplete, so
that the premium charged for a reduction in economic volatility is high. Thus, extracting
rents too soon is dangerous because it exposes the economy to negative shocks, whereas
increasing public savings raises economic protection and boosts the incentive and ability
2to extract rents in the future in an economic boom. In the absence of this assumption,
a rent-seeking government over-borrows since rent-seeking activity in the future can be
decoupled from tax smoothing by the use of contingent claims, reducing any incentive for
the government to over-save. Third, there exists a rent-less policy-making regime, which
means that for a given level of institutions, the government collects zero rents if resources
are su¢ ciently scarce. This assumption implies that as the government accumulates as-
sets, future rents are concentrated during booms, so that a reduction in institutional
quality increases the government￿ s return on saving by facilitating rent extraction during
these booms.
This paper builds on the literature on optimal ￿scal policy and debt management
dating back to the classical work of Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983).3 We
depart from this work by relaxing the assumption of a benevolent government and by
assuming that the economy is managed by politicians who derive partial utility from rents
and who face potential replacement. In this regard, this paper is most closely related to
and complements the work of Battaglini and Coate (2008). As in our work, they consider a
setting in which current governments face economic risk and political risk. They show that
the presence of political risk implies that in the long run, a rent-seeking government holds
a non-degenerate distribution of government debt which exceeds that of the benevolent
government. We depart from their work (i) by focusing on the e⁄ect of institutional
quality as opposed to political risk in generating political economy distortions and (ii) by
focusing on the short run implications of political economy distortions. In the process, we
describe a novel over-saving mechanism driven by the option value of rent-seeking and we
relate this option value to the institutional quality of a government.4 Finally, our over-
saving result is related to the work of Yared (2008) who argues that prescribing high levels
of savings in the presence of rent-seeking politicians is distortionary since it is associated
with the anticipation of future rents.5 In contrast, in the current paper we explain these
high savings as an endogenous mechanism to extract future rents when e⁄ective economic
uncertainty is high.
This introduction is followed by ￿ve sections and an appendix. Section 2 describes
a simple environment where economic uncertainty is concentrated in one period, while
3See also Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002), Bohn (1990), and Chari and Kehoe
(1993a,1993b).
4For additional work on the political economy of debt, see for example Aghion and Bolton (1990),
Alesina and Perotti (1994), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Amador (2003), Lizzeri (1999), Persson and
Svensson (1989), and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2008).
5Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008) also study the e⁄ect of political economy distortions on
taxes in a Mirleessian economy, though they do not consider the e⁄ect on government debt.
3Section 3 describes the corresponding equilibrium and the role played by the quality of
political institutions. Section 4 extends the model to incorporate ongoing uncertainty.
Section 5 explains the role of three important assumptions behind our results. Section 6
concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs.
2 Model
In this section, we describe a simpli￿ed version of the incomplete market economy orig-
inally studied by Barro (1979) and more recently studied by Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent,
and Seppala (2002). In contrast to this work which assumes the presence of a benevo-
lent government, we allow for the existence of rent-seeking politicians. In Section 5.2, we
examine the e⁄ect of adding insurance markets.
2.1 Economic Environment
There are time periods t = f0;:::;1g. In every period, the government ￿nances exogenous
public spending g > 0, rents xt ￿ 0, and debt bt R 0 by raising revenue ￿t ￿ 0 and
borrowing bt+1 R 0 from the private sector at a price ￿ 2 (0;1) which equals the social
rate of discounting. In addition, the government experiences an exogenous endowment
shock yt = f￿￿;￿g for ￿ > 0. b0 and y0 are given. The government￿ s dynamic budget
constraint is
bt = ￿t ￿ g + yt ￿ xt + ￿bt+1 (1)
with limt!1 ￿
tbt+1 = 0. In order to simplify our discussion, we assume for now the
following simple process for yt:
Prfy1 = :::: = y1 = ￿g = Prfy1 = :::: = y1 = ￿￿g = 1=2,
so that all uncertainty is resolved in period 1.
2.2 Political Environment
The economy is managed by politicians who dislike the deadweight loss of taxes but who
value rents conditional on being in power. The deadweight loss of raising revenue ￿ is
quadratic and equal to c(￿) = ￿2
2 + ￿. The utility from rents x is linear and equal to
4v (x) = x. The period t politician in power receives the ￿ ow utility
￿c(￿t) + (￿ + 1)v (xt), (2)
for ￿ ￿ 0 which parameterizes the politician￿ s desire for rents. If a given candidate
politician is out of power in period t, then his ￿ ow utility is ￿c(￿t).
Politicians are replaced through an exogenous stochastic process which is independent
of and occurs together with the realization of the shock to yt. Regime changes are not
insurable. To simplify our discussion, we assume that the period 0 politician remains in
power from period 1 onward with probability q 2 (0;1). With probability 1 ￿ q he is out
of power and replaced with an identical politician who remains in power from period 1
onward. As with economic uncertainty, all political uncertainty is resolved in period 1.
In Section 4, we show that our insights translate to an economy in which both economic
and political uncertainty are ongoing.
Note that an economy managed by a benevolent planner is subsumed in our setting.
In particular, if we let ￿ = 0 and q ! 1, then the implied policies will correspond to those
originally studied by Barro (1979) and more recently studied in Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent,
and Seppala (2002). This is because the government is permanently in power, and rents
can be interpreted as lump sum transfers to households which are made whenever the
government holds su¢ ciently low levels of debt that taxes can be set to zero. This is
because c0 (0) = 1 and the marginal value of rents is 1 under a benevolent government.
Levels of ￿ which exceed 0 capture the politician￿ s bias toward wasteful spending rela-
tive to consumers￿preferences. Thus, one can interpret higher levels of ￿ as corresponding
to a society with lower quality of political institutions. Our model of political economy
subsumes the setting of Battaglini and Coate (2008) in which politicians receive a ￿ ow
utility which can be represented by (2), and it builds on their work by disentangling the
e⁄ect of the rent-seeking motive ￿ from the e⁄ect of political risk q.
Another feature of this environment is limited commitment arising from the fact that
q < 1. Whoever acquires power in period 1 cannot commit to particular policies in period
0. Consequently, the period 0 politician must take into consideration how his choice of b1
a⁄ects the incentives of the period 1 politician. Note that welfare losses due to limited
commitment go to zero as q approaches 1, which means that limited commitment has
no impact on the benevolent government benchmark with ￿ = 0 and q ! 1. The main
focus in this paper is on the e⁄ect of institutional quality ￿ and therefore we highlight
economies with q ! 1.
52.3 Government Objective
Our simple stochastic environment implies that we can think of our economy as subsumed
into two periods with the following order of events:
1. The period 0 politician chooses ￿0, x0 , and b1.
2. Shocks are realized:
(a) Economic shock yt = f￿￿;￿g for t = 1;:::;1, and
(b) Potential replacement of the period 0 politician for t = 1;:::;1.
3. The period 1 politician chooses continuation policies f￿t;xt;bt+1g
1
t=1.
Given this structure, we can write the objective of the period 1 politician as follows:
V






t￿1 (￿c(￿t) + (￿ + 1)v (xt)) (3)
s.t. (1), ￿t;xt ￿ 0 8t ￿ 1, b1, and yt = y1 8t ￿ 1. (4)
V P (b1;y1) represents the value of holding political power in period 1 as a func-




















the value of being out of power in period 1 as a function of debt b1 and shock y1.
This means that the objective of the period 0 politician is as follows:
max
￿0;x0;b1
￿c(￿0) + (￿ + 1)v (x0) + ￿Ey1
￿
qV




s.t. b0 = ￿0 ￿ g + y0 ￿ x0 + ￿b1, and ￿0;x0 ￿ 0, (6)
where we have taken into account that the period 0 politician becomes the period 1
politician with probability q.
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1 (b1) and ￿L
1 (b1) analogously.6
Lemma 1 The period 1 politician￿ s strategy is
￿
j









1 (b1) = max
￿
0;￿ ￿ g + y
j
1 ￿ b1 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(8)
for j = H;L and yH = ￿yL = ￿.
From period 1 onward, taxes are constant in all periods, which follows from the tax
smoothing arguments originally made by Barro (1979). Moreover, if rents are positive,
then taxes must be ￿, and if taxes exceed ￿, then rents are 0. For example, in the case of
the benevolent government, ￿ = 0 and rents￿ which are e⁄ectively lump sum transfers to
households￿ are only positive once taxes have been driven down to zero.
Remark 1 ￿L
1 (b1) ￿ ￿H
1 (b1) by (7) and xH
1 (b1) ￿ xL
1 (b1) by (8).
The period 1 politician always consumes weakly more rents when the economy is
experiencing a boom. This is because the government￿ s budget constraint is looser, and
rent-seeking is easier to achieve without additional increases in taxes.






































6We de￿ne average rents since linearity implies that there are multiple sequences of rents which solve
the objective for a given unique optimal level of average rents.
7In solving (5) ￿ (6), Lemma 1 implies that there are three regions to consider with






b1 (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ g + ￿
b1 (1 ￿ ￿) 2 [￿ ￿ g ￿ ￿;￿ ￿ g + ￿)
b1 (1 ￿ ￿) < ￿ ￿ g ￿ ￿
Rents
xH
1 (b1) = 0 and xL
1 (b1) = 0
xH
1 (b1) > 0 and xL
1 (b1) = 0
xH
1 (b1) > 0 and xL
1 (b1) > 0
.
In region I the government is relatively poor in period 1, so that it is ine¢ cient to
use government resources for rents in that period. For intermediate values of b1 (region
II), rents are appropriated only under a favorable y1 shock. Finally, in region III the
government is rich and rents are appropriated under both shocks.
It is apparent from (5) ￿ (6) that since q < 1, we can disregard region III. The date
0 politician will never leave enough resources for the date 1 politician to consume rents
in both states of the world, for in such case it is strictly better for the current politician
to consume with certainty a bit more rents at date 0. Thus, in the next sections we only
characterize regions I and II.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Benevolent Government Benchmark
We begin by reviewing the policies of the benevolent government which corresponds to a
special case of our economy with ￿ = 0 and q ! 1, so that politicians do not reap extra
bene￿ts from rents and they do not face signi￿cant political risk. We characterize our
policies as a function of z0 ￿ b0 ￿y0, the initial negative cash in hand of the government.
The optimal solution entails the government using assets to smooth the deadweight
loss of taxation, and since the marginal deadweight loss is proportional to the tax itself,







If ￿ = 0, for instance, taxes would be perfectly smooth with ￿0 = ￿H
1 = ￿L
1.
The following proposition characterizes the solution to the benevolent government￿ s
problem. All proofs are in the Appendix. We denote the policies of a benevolent govern-
ment with superscript B.




























1￿￿ , the economy is in region I and the government is relatively poor. Rents
are zero everywhere, taxes are positive at all dates, and the government rolls over its
initial negative cash in hand into period 1 debt. This region is illustrated on the right







































Region II Region I
Once negative cash in hand decreases below
￿g+￿
1￿￿ , the government has a su¢ ciently
low level of debt to drive some taxes to zero and to pay for some rents, so that the
economy enters region II. In turn, this region is divided into two subregions. Speci￿cally,







, the government extracts rents only in
10period 1 (under the high shock), while if z0 <
￿g￿￿￿
1￿￿ , the government extracts rents both
in period 1 and in period 0. Note that under the benevolent government whenever rents
are positive, the corresponding taxes are equal to zero.







is that the government begins to
accumulate assets at a faster rate: We have that bB
1 < z0, so that the government takes
advantage of its currently low level of debt to set aside tax revenue to repay the interest
on b0 and to also reduce the size of its negative cash in hand going forward. However,
once z0 declines below
￿g￿￿￿
1￿￿ , period 0 taxes reach zero, and any additional resources
at the government￿ s disposal are utilized as period 0 rents rather than to reduce debt
(accumulate assets) further.7
3.2 Rent-Seeking Government
We now consider the e⁄ect of political institutions by letting the value of ￿ exceed 0. In
order to focus our attention on the pure e⁄ect of institutional quality, we continue to let
q ! 1, so that the government does not face signi￿cant political risk. We do this for
expositional simplicity, as the qualitative features of its (simpler) equilibrium are shared
by other q cases whenever the level of political risk embedded in q is low relative to the
level of economic risk ￿. We treat the general case in Section 5.1. We denote the policies
of a rent-seeking government with superscript P.



























1 is strictly decreasing in ￿ for an intermediate range of z0 2 (z0;z0)
and strictly increasing in ￿ for z0 < z0.
The main insight of the proposition is the existence of an intermediate range of initial
debt when worse political institutions lead to more rather than less public savings. Let
us explore the connection between saving (debt reduction), government resources, and
7Our simple model helps to understand the long run dynamics in Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and
Seppala (2002) in which the government reaches the natural asset limit
￿g￿￿
1￿￿ . At every t, the government
chooses bB
t+1 ￿ zt until some stochastic date t + k where zt+k ￿
￿g￿￿￿
1￿￿ . After this date, debt equals
￿g￿￿
1￿￿ and negative cash in hand is below
￿g￿￿￿
1￿￿ , which is consistent with the description of our simple
economy.
11political institutions more generally. The dotted line in Figure 5 displays the reaction
function of the government, with the benevolent benchmark in a solid line. For high levels
of debt, a benevolent and rent-seeking government are indistinguishable from one another.
This is because the high level of initial debt forces governments to act responsibly and to







































As debt declines, the rent-seeking government enters the ￿rst subregion of region II.
Here the rent-seeking government begins to accumulate resources at a faster pace than
13the benevolent government. However, these high savings need not represent good news
for society, as they are not so much driven by tax-stabilization as they are by future rent
extraction. Though a rent-seeking government saves more than a benevolent government
for intermediate ranges of debt, once it reaches a su¢ ciently low level of debt, it saves less
than the benevolent government. Hence, a rent-seeking government acts in a seemingly
prudent fashion earlier than a benevolent government, but it does so because it expects
to squander these savings in the future if aggregate conditions in the form of a future




stops responding to z0 since any increases in current levels of resources are squandered on
current rents. In contrast, a benevolent government takes advantage of reductions in z0
to set aside resources for the protection of the economy in the future since bB
1 decreases
in z0 until it reaches the natural asset limit.8
Figure 6 illustrates the corresponding rents. For high levels of debt, rents are zero







, the economy under the rent-seeking
government enters region II (positive rents at date 1 in the high state), and an increase
in government assets (a reduction in z0) leads to an increase in rents at date 1. Finally,
once government assets have risen enough so that z0 <
￿￿g￿￿￿
1￿￿ , the government stops
increasing its savings in response to an increase in its resources and any additional initial
assets are used on period 0 rents.
Figure 7 illustrates the value of taxes behind these rents and savings. There are three
results that stand out: First, on average, taxes are higher in the presence of rent-seeking








take better advantage of reductions in z0 to protect the economy during downturns since
taxes during recessions are reduced in response to increases in z0. Third, and most
importantly (middle panel), for z0 <
￿￿g+￿
1￿￿ , politicians fail to cut taxes during booms.
Politicians extract a large amount of rents during booms (second panel of Figure 6), as
they arrive to that state with high savings and unwilling to cut taxes.
In summary, while the literature on the political economy of debt, in particular the
recent work of Battaglini and Coate (2008), focuses on the long run di⁄erences between
a rent-seeking and a benevolent government, we focus on the transition. Our main con-
tribution is to show that, contrary to the long run result, along the equilibrium path, a
rent-seeking government may save more than a benevolent government because by do-
ing so it raises the rent-seeking opportunities in the future. We describe the mechanism
8The same reasoning as in Footnote 7 implies that in a dynamic economy with ongoing uncertainty,
the rent-seeking government￿ s long run level of debt is
￿￿g￿￿
1￿￿ which exceeds that of the benevolent
government.
14behind this result in the next section.
3.3 Option Value of Rent-Seeking
Consider the indirect utility function of the government as a function of ￿resources￿
r ￿ x ￿ ￿, which from Lemma 1 is:
u(r;￿) = ￿c(maxf￿r;￿g) + (￿ + 1)maxf0;r + ￿g.
This function is increasing and weakly concave in r. For low values of r, rents are zero
and u(r;￿) = ￿c(￿r) is quadratic in r and independent of ￿. In this rent-less region,
politicians and benevolent governments have the same savings incentives, which do not
include precautionary savings since utility is quadratic. On the opposite end, rents arise
when r is very large and then u(r;￿) = ￿c(￿) + (￿ + 1)(r + ￿), which is linear in r so
that there is also no precautionary motive. However, the important feature of u(r;￿) is
the transition from the region in which there are zero rents to the region in which rents
become positive since, as illustrated in Figure 8, marginal utility becomes convex , which
gives rise to a sort of ￿precautionary￿savings motive (e.g., Kimball, 1990 and Caballero,
1990).













Moreover, since the transition from the rent-less to the rent-extraction region occurs
15at lower levels of r for politicians, their ￿precautionary￿savings take place earlier than
for the benevolent government. This is what is behind our main result in Proposition 3.
While the mathematical argument is that of the precautionary savings literature, de-
scribing our mechanism as ￿precautionary￿is somewhat of a misnomer. The extra-savings
are entirely induced by rent-seeking possibilities which create a lower bound on marginal
utility. The di⁄erence in the marginal utility of resources between a benevolent and
rent-seeking government￿ which widens for an intermediate level of resources￿ can be more
appropriately described as an option value of rent-seeking, a terminology which we adopt
henceforth.
What do these di⁄erences in the indirect utility function imply about the behavior
of government debt in a dynamic environment? Consider the government￿ s ￿rst order
condition with respect to b1, which after substitution of (1) can be written as:
u
0 (￿z0 ￿ g + ￿b1;￿) =
u0 ((￿b1 (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ g + ￿);￿) + u0 (￿b1 (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ g ￿ ￿;￿)
2
. (10)
This condition states that the marginal cost of savings at date zero (left hand side)
must equal the marginal bene￿t of savings at date 1 (right hand side), which is the average
of the marginal utility of resources in the boom and in the downturn. In terms of the
indirect utility function, by reducing b1 the government increases resources r1 in period 1
at the expense of resources r0 in period 0. This tradeo⁄ depends on the initial negative
cash in hand of the government z0. When z0 is large, feasible levels of resources are low
and none of the terms in (10) is a⁄ected by increases in ￿ since the economy is in the
rent-less region in both periods.
However, for intermediate levels of z0, rent-seeking takes place during the boom in
period 1 but not otherwise. Thus, holding the level of b1 constant, on the one hand an
increase in ￿ raises the right hand side of (10) by increasing the marginal bene￿t of rent-
seeking in the boom. On the other hand, the increase in ￿ has no e⁄ect on the marginal
utility of resources for the date 0 government and the date 1 government in the downturn
since these two governments are in the rent-less regime. Therefore, the increase in ￿ in
this region enhances the incentive for a government to save because it increases the option
value of rent-seeking.
Naturally, the value of this option rises with economic uncertainty. Holding b1 con-
stant, an increase in ￿ increases the right hand side of (10) by increasing the marginal
value of resources at date 1 in the downturn. In the rent-less regime, this increase in the
marginal value of resources in the downturn would be o⁄set by a decrease in the mar-
ginal value of resources in the boom. However, because of the presence of rent-seeking
16activities at date 1 during the boom, this o⁄setting mechanism is no longer present, and
the government responds to the rise in uncertainty by saving more, which simultaneously
protects the economy in the downturn while providing additional rents to politicians in
the boom.
The role of uncertainty is illustrated in Figure 9, which shows the behavior of savings
as a function of uncertainty for di⁄erent governments. The ￿gure shows that it is only
when uncertainty￿ and thus the option value of rent-seeking￿ becomes su¢ ciently high that







In conclusion, we have argued that our economy generates a novel over-saving mech-
anism which emerges from the transition from a rent-less to a rent-seeking region of
resources. In Section 5.3, we show that analogous arguments can be made for general
utility functions c(￿) and v (￿) as long as the rent-less regime exists.
4 Ongoing Uncertainty
In this section, we show that the main insights of our simple economy with one-shot
uncertainty resolution translate to an economy with ongoing uncertainty. We show that a
rent-seeking government is left with higher levels of debt in the long run than a benevolent
government. However, the new insight in our paper is that along the equilibrium path, a
17rent-seeking government places more value on future rents than a benevolent government,
and it therefore accumulates resources at faster pace￿ i.e., it holds lower debt￿ during part
of the transition phase.
Consider an economy analogous to our previous one with the modi￿cation that
Prfyt = ￿g = Prfyt = ￿￿g = 1=2 8t ￿ 1
and the probability that a given politician is able to extract rents in period t is q. Economic
shocks and political shocks are i.i.d. and are independent of each other as in the one-shot
economy.
The government￿ s objective can be written recursively as a function of the state vari-
able zt. We let V P (z) and V N (z) represent the politician￿ s value of holding and being
out of political power, respectively, as a function of z.
V
P (z) = max











z = ￿ ￿ g ￿ x + ￿b
0 and
￿;x ￿ 0,
where given the solution f￿￿ (z);x￿ (z);b0￿ (z)g, V N (z) is de￿ned as:
V
N (z) = ￿c(￿




0￿ (z) ￿ y
0) + (1 ￿ q)V
N (b




The only di⁄erence between V P (z) and V N (z) is that the former incorporates the
bene￿t of current rents, whereas the latter does not. We focus on the case with q ! 1
for analogous reasons as in Section 3.2. Since V P (z) cannot be explicitly characterized,
we present our result using a numerical simulation. For this purpose, we simulate an
economy with the following parameters: f￿;￿;gg = f:8;100;80g and compare outcomes
for institutional parameters ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 80.
Figure 10, which is analogous to Figure 5, displays the level of b0 as a function of the
negative cash in hand of the government z. As in the two-period economy, if z is su¢ ciently
high, the behavior of debt is similar under a benevolent and rent-seeking government. In
contrast, once z declines below a certain level, the rent-seeking government decumulates
debt at a faster rate than the benevolent government. Finally, once z becomes su¢ ciently
low, the debt of the rent-seeking government remains stable at b0 = (￿ ￿ g ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿)￿
the natural asset limit of the rent-seeking government￿ whereas the benevolent government
18continues to decumulate debt. For very low levels of z, both governments are in their
long run steady states, with the rent-seeking government holding more debt than the
benevolent government.
Figure 10: Debt

















In Figure 11, we simulate the two economies under the same sequence of shocks start-
ing from the same initial level of debt b0 = 0. There are two important features displayed
in this ￿gure. First, note that after a sequence of favorable shocks, the rent-seeking gov-
ernment begins to save at a faster pace than the benevolent government so that the
rent-seeking government holds a lower level of debt than the benevolent government. Sec-
ond, eventually, the rent-seeking government reaches its natural asset limit and stops
decumulating debt, whereas the benevolent government continues to decumulate debt un-
til it reaches its own natural asset limit. These results are equivalent to those shown in
the simpler model.
Thus, we conclude that the empirical observation that emerging markets are accumu-
lating resources faster than in the past sheds little light on whether this is mostly due to
responsible policy-making or to rent-seeking behavior in disguise.
19Figure 11: Path of Debt













5 Understanding the Assumptions
In this section, we explain the importance of three assumptions in generating our over-
saving result. First, we show that economic uncertainty must be high relative to political
uncertainty. Second, we argue that markets must be su¢ ciently incomplete. We do this
by allowing the government to hedge economic risk at a high enough premium, and in the
process, we achieve an additional result that a rent-seeking government will under-hedge
relative to a benevolent government. Finally, we argue that an important force behind
the option value of rent-seeking is the existence of a rent-less regime: Governments only
contemplate rent-seeking once resources become abundant.
5.1 High Economic and Low Political Risk
In order to highlight the importance of economic risk relative to political risk, we present
a complete characterization of Section 2￿ s economy for all q < 1. This allows us to
show that our main over-saving result does not change as long as political risk 1 ￿ q is
low relative to economic risk ￿. Moreover, we argue that the conventional wisdom in
the political economy literature that rent-seeking induces over-borrowing emerges along
the entire equilibrium path in economies in which political risk 1 ￿ q is large relative to
20economic risk ￿.






Proposition 4 The rent-seeking government chooses:
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Proposition 5 If ￿ < ￿
￿, bP
1 is strictly decreasing in ￿ for an intermediate range of
z0 2 (z0;z0) and strictly increasing in ￿ for z0 < z0.
Proposition 6 If ￿ < ￿
￿, bP
1 is decreasing in q.
The introduction of political risk brings about a new element to the decision-making
of the government. Consider a rent-seeking government which expects to extract positive
rents in the future with probability q. If q is reduced, this implies an increase in political
risk and a reduction in the probability that the current government will have access to
these rents. This reduces the government￿ s incentive to save, so that debt bP
1 increases in
response.9
More central to our main message, the threshold ￿
￿ determines a precise meaning
to the statement that economic uncertainty is high relative to political risk, as this is
linked to the institutional development of a society. Speci￿cally, if ￿ < ￿
￿, then economic
risk is high relative to political risk. Thus, as in the cases considered in Section 3, the
government continues to behave in a precautionary fashion for intermediate values of z0
9Note that, contrary to intuition, higher levels of q are not always good for welfare since they can
promote excessive savings. It can be shown that social welfare is weakly increasing in q for low values of
z0 and weakly decreasing in q for high values of z0. Details available upon request.
21if it has lower institutional quality since it is extracting rents in period 1. The degree
to which the rent-seeking government accumulates resources faster than the benevolent
government depends on the interaction between q and ￿, since the option value of rent-
seeking is increasing in q, the probability of retaining power into the future. Moreover, for
very low levels of z0, a rent-seeking government squanders any additional improvements
in its asset position whereas a benevolent government sets aside more initial resources to
protect the economy in the future.
In contrast, if ￿ > ￿
￿, the rent-seeking government always under-saves relative to
the benevolent government, and debt is always weakly decreasing in institutional quality.
Rents are never extracted in period 1, since political risk is too high relative to economic
volatility. Starting from a high enough level of abundance, any increase in initial re-
sources translates into an increase in current levels of rents. Therefore, the option value
of rent-seeking is non-existent because political risk is too high relative to economic risk.
Moreover, this means that in the region in which z0 is below
￿￿g+￿
1￿￿ , government debt
increases with the level of economic volatility ￿. This is because the period 0 government
wishes to starve the future governments of boom rents which increase in economic volatil-
ity, and it does so by increasing government debt. Thus, the conventional wisdom in the
political economy of debt literature that rent-seeking induces over-borrowing (e.g., Alesina
and Perotti, 1994) holds only in the case of low economic and high political uncertainty
(low ￿ and low q).
5.2 Incomplete Markets
The previous section highlighted that the government￿ s motive to save depends on the
relative importance of political and economic risk. In practice, the latter risk is partially
endogenous. In this section we model this endogeneity by allowing the government to
hedge some of the economic risk. We show that as long as political risk is low relative
to both economic risk and the hedging premium, there is a region where politicians save
more and hedge less than benevolent governments. Nonetheless, as the hedging premium
goes to zero this region vanishes, which highlights the importance of incomplete markets
behind our main transitional over-saving result.
Consider the economy of Section 2, and let us assume that in addition to b1, the period
0 government can purchase insurance ￿ ￿ 0 at unit price ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0. For all t ￿ 1,
the government receives an insurance payment equal to ￿ if y1 = ￿￿ and equal to ￿￿
otherwise.
We refer to ￿ as the amount of hedging purchased by the government. Since this
22insurance has an expected value of 0, ￿ e⁄ectively represents the hedging premium, and
the economy analyzed in the previous sections corresponds to a case in which the hedging
premium is arbitrarily large so that no government would ever choose to hedge. Note that
an economy in which ￿ = 0 corresponds to the complete market economy of Lucas and
Stokey (1983).
The welfare of households and politicians along with the order of events remains un-
changed, with the exception that the period 0 politician must now allocate savings across
￿b1 and ￿ in period 0. We characterize the behavior of all governments as q ! 1. More-
over, we assume that ￿ < ￿
￿+￿ so that some hedging takes place. There are two main
results:
Proposition 7 If ￿ > 0, bP
1 is strictly decreasing in ￿ for an intermediate range of
z0 2 (z0;z0) and strictly increasing in ￿ for z0 < z0.
Proposition 8 The amount of hedging ￿P is weakly decreasing in ￿.
An important implication of Proposition 7 is that the over-saving result from Section
3 is robust to the introduction of hedging.
Proposition 8 shows that the level of hedging by a rent-seeking government is lower
than that of a benevolent government. This is because of the option value of rent-seeking.
Hedging ties the hands of the government during a boom whereas savings increases the
scope for rent-seeking during a boom, and for this reason, the rent-seeking government is
biased against hedging.
What if hedging is very cheap? It turns out that there is a critical level 1 ￿ q, such
that if ￿ drops below this value, the previous results are overturned and the traditional
intuitions related to over-borrowing by rent-seeking governments are upheld. Due to space
restrictions, we illustrate this point with ￿ = 0.


















If ￿ = 0, all governments fully insure the economy against shocks, therefore removing
the precautionary motive from the government￿ s calculus. bB
1 ￿ z0 everywhere since there
is no incentive to accumulate resources. It is cheaper for politicians to use the hedging
instrument as opposed to contingent rent-seeking in order to reduce the volatility of taxes.
23Hedging serves its usual purpose as a bu⁄er for downturns (i.e., it reduces economic risk),
but it also allows the government to frontload whatever rents it could acquire during a
future boom and hence it also reduces political risk. That is, the possibility for hedging
economic risk disentangles the dual role for savings driving the over-accumulation of
savings when markets are incomplete. Put di⁄erently, hedging economic risk also serves
as proxy-hedging for political risk.10
5.3 Existence of a Rent-less Regime
Throughout, we have speci￿ed the politician￿ s utility in (2) as consisting of a quadratic cost
of taxes and a linear utility in rents. This allows us to shut down the precautionary motive
in the benevolent and non-benevolent regions of the utility function and to highlight how
the transition from one region to the other can generate ￿precaution￿and an option value
of rent-seeking. In this section, we show that our over-saving result does not depend on
the quadratic cost of taxes or the linear bene￿t of rents, but instead relies on the existence
of a region in which politicians set rents to zero.
Let us consider the economy of Section 2 under a more general set of functions c(￿) and
v (￿) to place in (2). Assume these two functions are continuous, increasing, and de￿ned
for ￿t 2 [￿;￿) and xt 2 [0;1), respectively. Moreover, v0 (0) ￿ c0 (0) so that rent-seeking
can occur. c(￿) is weakly convex and v (￿) is weakly concave.11




0 (￿) > (￿ + 1)v
0 (0). (11)
Mathematically, (11) states that the marginal value of minimal rents is exceeded by
the marginal cost of maximal taxation. In other words, governments will stop extracting
rents beyond a certain threshold since taxes are too high. In our simple economy described
in the text, ￿ = 1 and (￿ + 1)v0 (0) = (￿ + 1) < lim￿t!￿ c0 (￿t) = 1, so that this
condition is satis￿ed. To understand the implications of this assumption, optimality for
the government in a given period t requires:
c
0 (￿t) ￿ (￿ + 1)v
0 (xt), (12)
10It can be shown for 0 < ￿ < 1 ￿ q that a rent-seeking government may also over-hedge. Details
available upon request.
11It can be veri￿ed that in an open or closed quasi-linear economy in which households consume and
work, the ￿ ow utility to households can be represented by a function ￿c(￿t) which depends on the
elasticity of labor. Under more general utility functions, ￿c(￿t) represents household welfare in an open
economy as long as households do not have access to ￿nancial markets.
24with equality if xt > 0. From (12), at an interior solution high taxes are associated with
low rents, and rents are weakly increasing in the rent-seeking motive ￿. Moreover, if taxes
exceed c0￿1 ((￿ + 1)v0 (0)), then rents are zero. Therefore, rent-seeking only begins once
resources become su¢ ciently abundant. Moreover, as the rent-seeking motive ￿ increases,
rent-seeking becomes more likely for a given level of resources.
Arguments analogous to those we made in Section 3.3 allow us to de￿ne an indirect
utility function u(r;￿) which features a transition from rent-less policy-making to rent-
seeking. Moreover, this transition￿ which occurs for lower values of r for regimes with
higher ￿￿ induces a value of u0 (r;￿) which is more convex earlier on than would be implied
in the absence of rent-seeking. Therefore, the transition to rent-seeking is associated with
more ￿precaution,￿as in our baseline economy.
What are the implications of the previous discussion for the level of b1? Starting from
high levels of z0, taxes are high and there is no rent-seeking at any date. Consequently,
a change in ￿ cannot a⁄ect savings since all governments are in the rent-less regime.
However, for intermediate levels of z0, rent-seeking will occur in period 1 under the high
shock, and it will not take place otherwise. In this region, there is an option value of rent-
seeking which increases with ￿. To understand why, note that equation (10) under the new
u(r;￿) function must hold in this context as a consequence of optimality. The marginal
cost of savings at date zero must equal the marginal bene￿t of savings at date 1. Now
consider the e⁄ect of an increase in ￿. As in the simple economy we have described in the
text, holding the level of b1 constant, the marginal bene￿t of rent-seeking￿ and therefore
the marginal value of resources￿ in an upturn increases. Furthermore, because of (11), the
marginal value of resources at other dates are una⁄ected since there is no rent-seeking at
those dates. The option value of rent-seeking rises, and the government saves more since
it bene￿ts even more from rents in a boom while simultaneously protecting the economy
in a downturn. This is stated formally in the next proposition which focuses on interior
solutions by considering economies with lim￿t!￿ c0 (￿t) = 1 and c00 (￿t) > 0.
Proposition 10 bP
1 is strictly decreasing in ￿ for an intermediate range of z0 2 (z0;z0).
An additional insight into Proposition 10 arises if one considers a counter-example.
For instance, let ￿c(￿t) = log(￿ ￿ ￿t) and v (xt) = log(xt). In this situation, (11) is
violated since v0 (0) = 1. Conditions (12) implies that xt = (1 + ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿t) so that rents
are a constant fraction of government resources. Consequently, (10) can be rewritten as:
1






b1 (1 ￿ ￿) + g ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
+
1
b1 (1 ￿ ￿) + g + ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
, (13)
25which means that the b1 that solves the above equation is independent of institutional
quality ￿. In this economy, there is no option value of rent-seeking. An increase in ￿,
holding b1 ￿xed causes a government to reallocate resources towards rent extraction versus
tax reduction at all dates, and this increases the marginal value of resources at all dates.
Moreover, because the increase in the marginal value of resources at date 1 is exactly
o⁄set by the increase in the marginal value of resources at date 0, the government￿ s
savings behavior is unchanged.
If instead v (xt) were replaced with log(e + xt) for some e > 0, then (11) would be
satis￿ed since v0 (0) = 1=e < 1. Intuitively, rent-seeking would only arise once resources
become su¢ ciently abundant. And in the transition phase to abundance, an option value
of rent-seeking emerges as the government looks forward to squandering accumulated
resources in a future boom.12
6 Final Remarks
The main insight of this paper is that high levels of public savings do not always represent
improvements in ￿scal management, but could instead re￿ ect rent-seeking in disguise.
This is due to an option value of rent-seeking that emerges in economies in which economic
volatility is high relative to political uncertainty, ￿nancial markets are incomplete, and
politicians behave responsibly whenever resources become su¢ ciently scarce. These forces
lead governments to ￿in￿ ate the beast￿temporarily because of the prospect of future rent-
seeking opportunities, a result which stands in opposition to the conventional wisdom in
political economy that rent-seeking governments always over-borrow.
Nonetheless, there is a limit to the extent to which such accumulations can persist,
since it is precisely the opportunity to eventually squander these funds which induces
politicians to forgo rent-extraction in the short run. In the long run, a rent-seeking
government wastes the resources which it accumulated so quickly whereas a benevolent
government preserves the resources which it accumulated more slowly.
Finally, we conjecture from our framework that currently popular ￿scal rules aimed
at constraining ￿scal surpluses and de￿cits are inadequate tools to deal with the rent-
seeking problem we describe. The reason is that the temporary increase in public savings
by politicans derives primarly from high taxation given its resources. Thus, it would seem
12Note that (11) is su¢ cient though not necessary for our over-saving result. It importantly sustains a










in the region of interest. Because
xL
1 is bounded from below by zero, the government cannot reduce future rents and increase current rents
by borrowing more. This counteracting force can be strong in settings in which rents are always interior.
26that a more appropriate mechanism to deal with perverse incentives in economies within
the region we describe is to cap taxes rather than to target ￿scal de￿cits and surpluses.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Multiply both sides of (1) by ￿
t and take the sum of these equations from t = 1 to
t = 1 subject to limt!1 ￿






t￿1 (￿t ￿ g + y1 ￿ xt): (14)
Consider the relaxed solution to (3) ￿ (4), which replaces each constraint (1) with (14),
assigning this latter constraint a Lagrange multiplier of ￿. Let ￿t represent the La-
grange multiplier for the non-negativity constraint on xt and let us ignore and later verify
that the non-negativity constraint on ￿t is satis￿ed. First order conditions imply that
c0 (￿￿
t (b1;y1)) = ￿ = ￿ + ￿t, so that taxes are constant and weakly greater than ￿, with
equality if rents are positive. This veri￿es that the non-negativity constraint on ￿t is
satis￿ed. Substitution into (14) given the de￿nitions of ￿
j
1 (b1) and x
j
1 (b1) implies that
￿
j
1 (b1) = g ￿ y
j
1 + b1 (1 ￿ ￿) + x
j
1 (b1) = ￿ if x
j
1 (b1) ￿ 0 and
￿
j
1 (b1) = g ￿ y
j
1 + b1 (1 ￿ ￿) > ￿ if x
j
1 (b1) = 0
implying Lemma 1. It can be veri￿ed that the solution to the relaxed problem satis￿es
(1) for all t. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
We prove Proposition 4 which is more general and consider the special case of ￿ = 0 and







subject to feasibility and subject to behavior of the period 1 government implied by
Lemma 1. Note that the solution admits xL
1 = 0, since otherwise b1 can be increased by
￿ > 0 arbitrarily small, xL
1 and xH
1 can be each decreased by ￿(1 ￿ ￿), and x0 can be
increased by ￿￿, leaving the period 0 government strictly better o⁄ since q < 1. Taking








































1 ￿ ￿ = ￿
H





1 ￿ ￿; (18)
x0 ￿ 0; and (19)
x
H
1 ￿ 0: (20)
We ignore and later verify that the constraint ￿L
1 ￿ ￿ is satis￿ed. We also later verify
that the constraint that ￿H
1 = ￿ if xH








1 represent the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (16)￿(20), respectively. First
order conditions yield:










1 = ￿0 + ￿1; (23)
x0 : ￿0 = ￿ + ￿0; and (24)
x
H
1 : ￿0 ￿ ￿1 = q￿ + ￿
H
1 . (25)
￿1 ￿ 0 from (22), (23), and Lemma 1.
Step 1. Imagine if z0 >
￿￿g+￿
1￿￿ , and let us assume and later verify that ’ = 0. In this
case, substitution of (21)￿(23) into (16) and (17) imply that ￿0 = ￿H
1 +￿ = ￿H
1 ￿￿ > ￿+￿,
verifying that ’ = 0 and implying that ￿0;￿
H
1 > 0 so that x0 = xH
1 = 0. Substitution of
(21) ￿ (23) into (16) and (17) implies that b1 = z0, and ￿L
1 ￿ ￿ is satis￿ed:








and ￿ < 2￿
1￿q. Imagine if ￿H
1 > ￿
so that ’ = 0 and xH
1 = 0. From (17) and (21) ￿ (23), this would imply that ￿0 > ￿ + ￿
so that from (21) and (24), x0 = 0. However, substitution into (16) given z0 <
￿￿g+￿
1￿￿
violates x0 = xH
1 = 0. Therefore, ￿H
1 = ￿. Imagine if ￿
H
1 = 0. (21), (23), and (25) imply
that ￿L




1￿￿ . Substitution into (16) and (17) yields b1 =
￿q￿+g￿￿+2z0
1+￿ .
However, substitution into (14) for y1 = ￿ leaves the condition that xH




1￿￿ . Given that ￿H
1 = ￿ and xH
1 = 0, substitution into (14) for
y1 = ￿ implies that b1 =
￿￿g+￿
1￿￿ , and ￿L
1 ￿ ￿ is satis￿ed.








and ￿ < 2￿
1￿q. From
step 2, it cannot be that ￿H
1 > ￿. Assume and later verify that ￿
H
1 = 0. From step 2, this
means that b1 =
￿q￿+g￿￿+2z0
1+￿ and we can verify by substitution into (14) for y1 = ￿ that
xH




Step 4. Imagine z0 <
￿(1+(1￿q)￿)￿g￿￿￿
1￿￿ and if ￿ < 2￿
1￿q. Let us assume and later verify
that ￿0 = ￿
H
1 = 0, so that from (21), (23), and (25), ￿0 = ￿H
1 = ￿ and ￿L
1 = ￿(2 ￿ q) ￿ ￿,
so that substitution into (14) for y1 = ￿￿ yields b1 =
￿(2￿q)￿g￿￿
1￿￿ , and ￿L
1 ￿ ￿ is satis￿ed.
We can verify that x0 > 0 and xH
1 > 0 by substitution into (16) and (17), taking into
account that ￿ > 2￿
1￿q and z0 <
￿(1+(1￿q)￿)￿g￿￿￿
1￿￿ .
Step 5. We are left with the case for which z0 <
￿￿g+￿
1￿￿ and ￿ > 2￿
1￿q. From step 2,
it cannot be that ￿H
1 > ￿. Imagine if xH
1 > 0 so that ￿
H
1 = 0. (21), (23), (24), and (25)
imply that ￿L
1 = 2￿0 ￿ q￿ ￿ 2￿(1 ￿ q). Since ￿H
1 = ￿ and xH
1 > 0, substitution into (17)
implies that ￿L
1 < ￿ + 2￿, which contradicts ￿ > 2￿
1￿q. Therefore xH
1 = 0. Given that
￿H
1 = ￿ and xH
1 = 0, substitution into (14) for y1 = ￿ yields b1 =
￿￿g+￿
1￿￿ , and ￿L
1 ￿ ￿ is
satis￿ed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
This follows from the solution described in the proof of Proposition 1 for ￿ ￿ 0 and
q ! 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
This follows from the solution described in the proof of Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
This follows from the solution described in the proof of Proposition 1 for ￿ ￿ 0 and
q < 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
This follows from the solution described in the proof of Proposition 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
This follows from the solution described in the proof of Proposition 4. Q.E.D.
30Proof of Proposition 7
We write the program as in the proof of Proposition 1 replacing (16) and (17), respec-
tively with















1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ = ￿
H
1 + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ x
H
1 : (27)
Let ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) represent the Lagrange multiplier for the non-negativity constraint on ￿.
The additional ￿rst order condition for ￿ is
￿ : ￿￿0 = ￿1 + ￿. (28)
Step 1. Imagine if z0 >
￿(1+￿￿2)=(1￿￿)￿g￿￿￿￿
(1￿￿) . If ￿ > 0, then the solution corresponds
to the same one described in Proposition 1 for z0 >
￿￿g+￿
1￿￿ which is independent of ￿. If
alternatively ￿ = 0, then (21)￿ (25) and (28) substituted into (26) and (27) imply that
￿0 = ￿H
1 =(1 ￿ ￿) = ￿L
1=(1 + ￿) > ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) > ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) so that from (24) ￿ (25) it is
the case that ￿0;￿
H
1 > 0 so that x0 = xH
1 = 0. Therefore, the solution is also independent
of ￿.







. Assume and later
verify that ￿ = 0 and ￿
H
1 = 0. (21) ￿ (23), (25), and (28) imply that ￿0 = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿),
￿H
1 = ￿, and ￿0 = ￿(1 + ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿). By substitution into (26) and (27) it can be veri￿ed
that all feasibility constraints are satis￿ed. b1 is increasing in ￿ and ￿ is decreasing in ￿:
b1 =
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + z0 (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿
￿ =
￿￿(1 + ￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) + g + ￿￿ + z0 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Step 3. Imagine if z0 <
￿(1+￿￿)=(1￿￿)￿g￿￿￿
(1￿￿) . If ￿ = 0 and ￿
H
1 = 0, then the constraint
that ￿ ￿ 0 is violated. If instead ￿0 = 0, then (21)￿(24) and (28) contradict the fact that
q ! 1. If ￿ = 0, ￿
H
1 > 0, and ￿0 > 0, then the solution corresponds to that described in
step 1, but this contradicts the fact that z0 <
￿(1+￿￿)=(1￿￿)￿g￿￿￿
(1￿￿) . The solution therefore
corresponds to that described in Proposition 1.
Step 4. Comparative statics with respect to ￿ follow from the above characterization
of the solution. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8
31This follows from the solution described in the proof of Proposition 7. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9
We ￿rst establish that ￿ = ￿. Otherwise, the period zero government can increase b1
by ￿ > 0 arbitrarily small, increase ￿ by ￿(1 ￿ ￿), reduce xH
1 by 2￿(1 ￿ ￿), and increase
x0 by ￿￿, which leaves it strictly better o⁄ since q < 1. Therefore, the solution in this
economy will resemble the original economy without hedging with ￿ = 0. We can apply
Proposition 4, taking into account that ￿ > 2￿
1￿q = 0 which leads to the solution. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10
















































It can be veri￿ed that z0 < z0.
Step 2. (12), (16), (17), and (29) imply that in the range z0 2 (z0;z0), the solution
admits x0 = xL
1 = 0, xH
1 > 0, and ￿L
1 > ￿0 > ￿H
1 .
Step 3. Consider an equilibrium in the range (z0;z0) and consider the consequences
of increasing ￿ by ￿ > 0 arbitrarily small, so as to remain in (z0;z0) under ￿ + ￿. If the
implied movement in b1 were weakly positive, then from (14) and (16), this would imply
that ￿0 weakly decreases and ￿L
1 weakly increases. From (12) and (29), this would require
￿H
1 to weakly decrease and xH
1 to strictly increase, violating (14). Therefore, b1 strictly
decreases in ￿. Q.E.D.
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